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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the initial Appellant's Brief and Appellee
Brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issues in this case are: (1) whether this Court should overrule or modify its decision
in Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992); (2) whether the Utah Education
Evaluation Act, Section 53A-10-101 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, (herein "EEA") creates
a private right of action by educators where a school district fails to comply with the requirements
of the EEA; (3) whether Plaintifl7Appellant (herein "Plaintiff") is entitled to reinstatement even if
her claim for damages is barred by governmental immunity; and (4) if the EEA creates a private
right of action, is the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30 1 et seq., Utah Code
Annotated 1953 , a defense as suggested by Defendant/Appellee (herein "Defendant").

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT EVEN IF
THE COURT DOES NOT MODIFY OR OVERRULE
PETERSON V, BROWNING
Defendant argues that the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine
sounds in tort and therefore Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Governmental Immunity Act,
Section 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953.

The arguments for overruling or

modifying Browning are set forth in Plaintiffs Brief. However, whether or not this Court
overrules or modifies Browning, Plaintiff submits that her Complaint seeks damages and
reinstatement for wrongful discharge. Plaintiffs Complaint, p. 5. ( R. 6)
It is well established that the Governmental Immunity Act is not a defense to equitable

claims. See, e.g., Bowles v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah
1982).
Reinstatement is an equitable remedy. Thurston v. Box Elder County. 260 Utah Adv.
Rep. 22, 1995 WL 130055 (Mar. 24, 1995),

P.2d

(Utah 1995). Accordingly,

governmental immunity is no defense to Plaintiffs requested reinstatement, although it may bar
monetary damages. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to have her case for wrongful discharge heard on
the issue of reinstatement.
POINT n
PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE DISCHARGED FOR REASONS
CONTRARY TO LAW WHETHER OR NOT SHE IS A
PROVISIONAL EMPLOYEE

A. The Utah Educator Evaluation Act is a Limitation on the Authority of
School Boards to Terminate Educators1 Employment Contracts and Creates a
Private Right of Action to Enforce those Rights.
In our Brief of Appellant ("Initial Brier), we demonstrated that the EEA creates a
privaterightof action. Specifically, we explained that this Court in Griflfin v MemmottT 814 P.2d
601 (Utah App. 1991), established a test to determine whether a statutory scheme creates a
privaterightof action. The application of the Griflfin test to the comprehensive statutory scheme
for identifying, notifying and remediating provisional educators indicates a legislative intent to
create in a provisional educator a privaterightof action to enforce the requirements of the statute.
In response, Defendant suggests that provisional educators may be discharged for "any
reason, or for no reason at all." Appellee's Brief, p. 7. There are, of course, many reasons
provisional employees may not be lawfully discharged. Among those reasons are the public policy
exceptions listed in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) at 1281-82. Educators
2

may not be terminated for exercising First Amendment rights. See Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that an educator may not be terminated for criticizing
the way in which his superintendent and school board raised and spent money); McLaughlin v.
Iflgndis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that two probationary teachers could not be
dismissed because they joined a union and that they had arightof free association); Bums v.
Willis Independent School District 713 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that although a school
board may refuse to renew a teacher's contract for any legitimate reason, it may not do so in
retaliation for the teacher's support for and association with former school board members). Nor
may educators, provisional or otherwise, be terminated because they are women, black, pregnant,
over age 40, or handicapped. See Section 34-35-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953. There are
many restraints on the authority of local boards of education to terminate employees. The
limitations are found in federal and state constitutions, in federal and state laws, and injudicial
decisions. The EEA is an additional limitation on the authority of local boards of education to
terminate provisional educators "for any reason, or for no reason at all.M
To avoid Plaintiffs argument that the EEA provides specific benefits to provisional
educators, Defendant argues that the primary purpose of the EEA is to "protect school authorities
from claims of negligence in hiring or retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable teachers."
Defendant's Brief, p. 15. Defendant makes its primary purpose argument because Cort v. Ask
422 U.S. 66,45 L. Ed 26, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975), at 422 U.S. 84 holds that no privaterightof
action is created absent an express statement of legislative intent where it is only a secondary
purpose to protect a specified class of persons.
Nothing in the EEA or the record supports Defendant's effort to argue that the primary
3

purpose of the EEA is the protection of school districtsfromnegligent hiring and Defendant
provides no reference to case law or statute in support of its assertion. Indeed, it is difficult to
read into the EEA anything to do with negligent hiring of employees as evaluations and
remediation take place after hiring occurs. Plaintiff does, however, agree that the EEA impacts
the retention of both provisional and continuing contract educators.
Defendant also states that Plaintiff is not entitled to EEA protection because
"[conspicuously absent is language requiring the District to attempt to remediate a provisional
teacher who is considered insubordinate."1 Defendant's Brief, p. 15. However, the EEA contains
several provisions which apply specifically to provisional educators and require remedial efforts
for those provisional educators whose performance is identified as inadequate. As we
demonstrated in our Initial Brief, these specific provisions indicate a legislative intent to create a
privaterightof action. Plaintiff submits that if the primary purpose of the EEA was to improve
school district's evaluation programs or protect from claims of negligent retention, the EEA
would not have in its provisions such detailedrightsand projections for provisional educators.
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-13.
Defendant may have attempted to insert the insubordination argument into this case for
the reason that courts have held that insubordination is not remediable. Board of Education of
Chicago v. Harris. 578 N.E. 2d 1244 (111. App. Ct. 1991). Plaintiff showed in her Initial Brief
that the actions of Plaintiff in advocating for a special education student are acts protected by
federal law. Further, during the investigation bv the Office of Civil Rights Compliance, Defendant

It is noteworthy that the Defendant asserts as evidence of Plaintiffs irremediable insubordination conduct
which Plaintiff was required by federal law to perform. See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 26. In any event, Plaintiff is entitled to
present evidence at trial as to whether or not her conduct is irremediable.

4

specifically denied that the Defendant terminated Plaintiffs employment because she had
advocated for the placement of J. B. in a special education program. See Plaintiffs Complaint
p. 3, % 13; and letterfromthe Office of Civil Rights dated April 9, 1993 attached in Addendum C.
The weakness of Defendant's arguments are found in the cases and authorities cited by it
for the proposition that the EEA provides no protection to provisional educators. Defendant
argues that Hopp v. Oroville School District No 410. 639 P.2d 872 (Wash. App. 2d 1982),
attached in Addendum A, holds that probationary teachers acquire norightsunder the
Washington Educator Evaluation law. (The Washington law is not included with Defendant's
Brief). In holding that the Washington Evaluation Law did not apply to provisional educators,
the court cited a section of Washington law relating to the termination of provisional teachers:
This section provides the exclusive means for nonrenewing the
employment contract of a provisional employee and no other
provision of law shall be applicable thereto.
(Emphasis original.) Id. at 875. The court held that because the foregoing statute was
enacted after the evaluation law, the legislature had expressly precluded the provisions of the
evaluation law from applying to the termination of provisional teachers.
Unlike the Washington law, Utah has no preemptive language. Additionally, the EEA
clearly defines therightsof provisional educators while the Washington scheme addressed "all
employees." The Washington court concluded that the failure of the legislature to specifically
mention probationary teachers in the evaluation law was "good reason to believe the probationary
requirements of (the evaluation law) do not apply to provisional teachers." Id. at 875-76.
The EEA, in contrast to the Washington law, clearly identifies therightsof provisional
educators. Thus, Hopp does not support Defendant's position, but instead suggests the
5

conclusion that where the statute specifically mentions provisional employees, it provides
protection to that class of individuals.

In Roberts v. Lincoln County School District Number One, 676 P.2d 577 (Wyo. 1984),
cited by Defendant, the plaintiff, a provisional teacher, claimed that the board's failure to follow its
own evaluation procedures was arbitrary and capricious. The evaluation policy of the Lincoln
County School board read:
Formal evaluations for nontenure teachers shall be made at least four times
each year on forms to be provided. Thefirsttwo evaluations shall be completed
before December, and the second two before March of each school year.
The minimum basic procedures leading to formal evaluations of teachers
shall include the following:
1. The principal or his designated representative (assistant principal, district administrator,
and/or supervisor) shall visit each teacher in the classroom several times during each
school year and shall record the general nature of visitations on a form to be provided,
with a copy for the teacher and the principal. All observations shall be conducted openly
and with the full knowledge of the teacher. A teacher or the principal or his designated
representative may request a conference to discuss the visit.
2. At least once each year in the case of tenure teachers, and at least twice each
year in the case of nontenure teachers, the principal or his designated
representative shall schedule a formal evaluative interview with each teacher prior
to the evaluation deadlines established.
Nowhere in the Lincoln policy are provisional teacher rights identified. The language is
minimal and focuses its direction to the principal or his designated representative to conduct
evaluations.
Not surprisingly, the Roberts court held, ,f[i]n this case, the regulations establishing
evaluative policies were not designed for the protection of nontenured teachers such as appellant,
but were primarily for the benefit of the school district in performing its operational and

6

supervisory duties." Id. at 581. 2
The Wyoming court also held that as Ms. Roberts was dismissed for reasons unrelated to
her teaching responsibilities, and the district's evaluation procedures adopted by the board related
to classroom duties, the evaluation did not relate to the decision to terminate Plaintiff as that
decision was based on her coaching duties. Id. at 581. Roberts is attached in Addendum A.
Leonard v. Converse County School District No 2 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1990), is a
restatement of RoheEtS> supra, with a twist. The complaint in Leonard alleged that both the
policies of the school district section of Wyoming state law "required that initial contract teachers
be evaluated in writing twice a year and receive copies of their evaluations." Id. at 1119. The
language of the statute under which Leonard was decided is much more succinct than the contract
language in RohfillS.
The court dismissed Ms. Leonard's complaint citing Roberts, supra, andfindingthat both
the statute and the district's evaluation policy were for the "benefit of the school district in
performing its operational and supervisory duties." Ibid. Leonard is attached in Addendum A.
Neither Roberts nor Leonard support Defendant's claim that the EEA does not apply to
provisional educators for the reason that the Lincoln and Converse County school district policies
lack any reference to the rights of provisional educators. The language of the statute and the
policies are what the Wyoming court construed them to mean: internal directions to

Because Roberts involved the board of education's interpretation of its own policies, the court adopted the
standard of review that it would only "interfere with school board actions if they are arbitrary and capricious or
fraudulent; however, we will not otherwise substitute our judgment. Absent abuse, we will not interfere with the
exercise of discretionary acts authorized by statute." Roberts. 676 P.2d 557,580. This is not the standard of review
this Court must apply. Where the Court is asked to construe the meaning of a state law, it reviews questions of general
law "under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision." Ouestar Pipeline Co. V. State
Tax Commission. 817 P.2d 316.318 (Utah 199R

7

administrators. Unlike the Lincoln and Converse County policies and the Wyoming teacher
evaluation law, the EEA specifically sets forth the rights of provisional educators and, among
other things, require that Plaintiff be advised regarding her alleged deficiencies and be given an
opportunity to remediate. Roberts, SUpia.
Defendants citation to Schofield v. Richland County School District. 447 S.E. 2d 189
(S.C. 1994), is also misplaced. Schofield was decided after a bench trial. The trial judge found
that the teacher's deficiencies were not areas included in the evaluation program. The trial judge
concluded that, "the School District may refuse to renew the contract of a provisional teacher on
the basis of performance concerns that arise independent of the statutory evaluation and
remediation procedures." Id. at 190. The court held at 447 S. E. 2d 191:
The plain language of section 59-26-40 requires the School district to provide remedial
assistance only in those areas in which deficiencies are noted during the three required
classroom evaluations. Here, Teacher's contract was not renewed based on performance
concerns that arose independently of the evaluation process.
(Emphasis original.)
The Schofield court also noted that the evaluation law specifically stated, "[i]f the
evaluation indicates that the provisional teacher has performed in an adequate manner, the teacher
is eligible for an annual contract." Id. at 191. The court emphasized that the statute used the
phrase "eligible" for an annual contract, not that the teacher was entitled to an annual contract.
Plaintiff submits that the law of Schofield entitles her to have the issue of whether the
Defendant's evaluation program would have addressed the "real reasons" for which her
employment with Defendant was not renewed and whether those deficiencies are remediable.
Defendant's citation to CRourke, M., Nonrenewal of Teacher Contracts: A Primer on

South Dakota Statutory and Case Law, 39 So. Dak. L. Rev. 237 (1994), is most helpful. Two
8

pages address teacher evaluation. Those pages are attached in Addendum B. The section on
teacher evaluation reads in part:
In Schauh, a nontenured, nonrenewed teacher sought reinstatement to her position
based on allegations that the school board did not follow its own rules in regard to teacher
evaluations. The court stated that it was unclear whether the board had violated any of its
own evaluation policies, but that it was clearfromthe record that Schaub knew "that the
Board was concerned with certain deficiencies in her teaching." In any event, the court
reiterated a test with regard to reinstatement under these circumstances:
[A] violation by the Board of a rule does not in and of itself justify
reinstatement of the teacher. The test in determining whether reinstatement
is the proper remedy for a violation of teacher evaluation statutes is
"whether a grievant has shown that the violation substantially and directly
impaired his or her ability to improve himself or herself and attain
continuing contract status."
The court held that since Schaub had prior knowledge of her deficiencies, and had ample
opportunity to correct them before her termination notice, any violation by the school
board of teacher evaluation policies did not "substantially or directly impair" the teacher's
ability to improve herself.
Id. at p. 262.
The CRourke article clearly supports Plaintiffs argument that the Defendant's failure to
truthfully advise her of deficiencies in her performance "substantially and directly" impaired her
ability to improve herself and entitles Plaintiff to have the fact issue of whether the District's
complaints about Plaintiff were remediable.
B.
Plaintiffs Claim for Violations of the Education Evaluation Act
are not Barred bv the Governmental Immunity A c t .
Defendant states that an action brought to remedy a violation of the EEA sounds in tort
and is therefore immunized. Plaintiff has previously argued that this cause of action is more in the
nature of a contract violation and is therefore not subject to the requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-24. It is elementary hornbook law
9

that:
The necessity of a special duty owed the plaintiff by the governmental body whose acts or
omissions are alleged to have caused him injury or damage may be deemed satisfied where
the conduct of the public entity violated a statute or ordinance enacted for the benefit of
the class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged. Thus, a statute imposing a mandatory
duty on a municipality through its officers or employees, and requiring action not only for
the protection of the general public but more particularly for the benefit of those persons
or class of persons within the ambit of the danger involved, provided a basis for municipal
liability where immunity had been abrogated by statute for those functions not involving
executive or administrative discretion. One court observed that whether the public duty
doctrine would exculpate the government from liability was irrelevant where the facts
showed a special duty owed under law to a class of persons to which the injured party
belonged.

57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School and State Tort Liability, § 143.
Defendant's argument that the Governmental Immunity Act is a defense in this case is an
attempt to apply Peterson in the area of statutory duty. If the EEA does not create a private right
of action, then Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs cause of action sounds in tort may be correct.
But if as we have shown the EEA does in fact create a privaterightof action, the Governmental
Immunity Act does not apply under either the breach of contract theory or the theory that
governmental immunity is waived where a statute is enacted "for the benefit of the class of
persons to which plaintiff belonged.M Id. at 57 Am Jur 2d § 143.
Accordingly, Defendant's contention that Governmental Immunity bars suits brought by
provisional educators under the EEA is without merit.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in granting Defendant summary judgment. The EEA creates a private
right of action. This case should be remanded to determine whether the Defendant substantially
complied with the requests of the EEA, whether the Defendant's failure to comply with the
requests of the EEA substantially and directly impaired Plaintiffs ability to improve herself and
10

whether any of the reasons for her nonrenewal were not remediable. Additionally, Plaintiff is
entitled to have her case heard by the trial court on the issue of reinstatement.
DATED this 12th day of May, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,

ichael'
East 5180 South
Murray, Utah 84107
(801) 266-4461
Attorney for Plaintifl7Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed this 12th day of May, 1995, postage
prepaid, to:
Elizabeth King
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

fiael T. McCoy
torney for PlaintiffAppellant
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RCW Title ^was repealed by implication.
Yet the unambiguous language of RCW
9A-04.010(3) states that Cook could be prosecuted under the former criminal provisions
as if the new criminal code had not been
enacted. Although not part of a repealing
act, the provision expresses the intent of
the legislature and cannot be ignored.
The judgment and sentence is affirmed.

2. Constitutional Law *»277(1)
Property interests are defined !::•,] i ules
which stem from state law.
3. Schools to 133.7
Provisional teacher did not have a fundamental property right to employment
which requires that provisional employees
statute be measured by strict scrutiny test;
rather, applicable review standard was
three-pronged rational basis test West's
RCWA 28A.67.072.

CORBETT and SWANSON, J.f concur.

4. Constitutional Law to 278.5(3)
Schools «=» 133.7
Provisional employees statute:.,, which •
applied alike to all first-year teaching or
iion,certificated employees in school district,
had a rational basis and was therefore not
unconstitutional West's RCWA 28A.67.-

ISYSIBT>

31 Wash.App. 184

Erik I , HOPP, Appellant,
v.
•

.'.'STRICT NO.

**',, ..impendent.

No. 4194-III-8.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3, Panel FourJan. 21, 1982.
Rehearing Denied March 12, 1982
Provisional high school teacher appealed from a decision of the Superior Court,
Okanogan County, B. E. Kohls, J., which
denied his writ of certiorari to review a
decision of the school district which refused
to renew his contract The Court of Appeals, Mclnturff, C. J., held that: (1) provisional employees statute, which applied
alike to all first-year teaching or noncertificated employees in school district, had a
rational basis and was therefore not unconstitutional, and (2) probationary provisions
of statute establishing evaluative criteria
and procedure for certificated employees
did not apply to provisional 'teacher.
Affirmed.
I C .tit , <
; i >nal Law <•=» 277(2)
There is no constitutional "property"
interest in public employment.

r

S\ Schools to 133.11
Probationary provisions of statute: esrung evaluative criteria and procedure
<rtificated employees did not apply to
<ional teacher. West's RCWA 28A.67.„•«. J3A.67.Q72.
6. Statutes to 1.81.(1), 184
In interpreting a statute it is duty of
court to ascertain and give effect to intent
and purpose of legislature.
7. Statutes to223.2(l)
Statutes in pari materia must be construed together in ascertaining legislative
intent in order to give each statute meaning
and "validity
8. Statutes to212.1
Legislature is presumed to' 'be familiar
with its prior enactments when creating a
new statute.
S. Statutes to 181(2)
No construction should be given to a
statute which leads to absurdity.
10. Schools to 133,15
School district was not contractually
bound to apply the dictates of statute establishing evaluative criteria and procedure for
certificated employees prior to nonrenewal

H O P P v OROV1LLE SCHOOL DIST NO 410

*aah

871

C1W «*, WastuApp^ est P-2d 872

of contract )f provisional teacher
RCWA 28A67 065 28A 67 072

West's

Hl

111 Schools * » 141(5)
Provisional high school teacher whose
contract was not renewed, who made no
showing t h a t school board exceeded its jurisdiction or that the proceedings were erroneous, void, or contrary to common law,
was not entitled to a writ of certiorari
authorizing review of school board's action
West a RCWA 7 16 040
Kelly Hancock, R J Sloan J r , Omak, for
appellant
William E Garnett, OroviUe, for respoi
dent
McINTURFF, Chief Judge
E n k Hopp appeals the denial i 1i
I
of certiorari to review a decisin . of the
Oroville School District No 410 (District)
T h a t decision precluded renewal of his cont r a c t after his initial year of teaching in the
District
Mr Hopp was hired
teach at Oroville High
1979-80 school year.
1979, withm the first 90

by the District to
School during the
On November 27,
days of the employ-

1. RCW 28A.67 065 states in part
'(1) The superintendent of public instruction
shall, on or before January 1,. 1977, establish
and may amend from time to time minimum
criteria for the evaluation of the professional
performance capabilities and development of
certificated classroom teachers and certificated
support personnel For claasroom teachers the
criteria shall be developed in the following categories Instructional skill; classroom management, professional preparation and scholarship,
effort toward improvement when needed; the
handling of student discipline and attendant
problems, and interest in teaching pupils and
knowledge of subject matter Such criteria
shall be subject to review by November 1,
1976, by four members of the legislature, one
from each caucus of each house, including the
chairpersons of the respective education committees
"It shall be the responsibility of a principal or
Ills or her designee to evaluate all certificated
personnel in his or her school During each
school year ail classroom teachers and certificated support personnel, hereinafter referred to
as "employees in this section shall be 11
939 P 24—M

ment period, an evaluar »n retort on Mr
Hopp was made by he pnn ipal if Oroville
* h S c h o o i T h € Diatrict 3 e v a l u a t l o n P°hcy includes evaluation criteria required by
28A 67 065 ^ including instructional
R C W
professional
skll,
da3sroom
m a n a ^ m e n t
p r e p a r a t l o n a n d scholarship, effort toward
when needed, handling .tuimprovement
dent

dl8Ciphnef

interest m teBchmg

knowU

^nonAi
quah.
tlea
T h e e v a luation noted vanous areas of
deficiency and suggested means of improvement'
On March 10 Mr Hopp was gnen an
annual evaluation report bj Principal Motta This report again noted deficiencies in
tanoua areas and a lack of improvement
irom the prior evaluation
On May 13,
1980, the superintendent of the school district advised Mr Hopp in writing of his
decision not to renew the teaching contract
for the 1980-81 school year, listing reasons
for the determination and advising him of
procedures for requesting reconsideration
of the decision
On May 16, 1980, Mr.
Hopp 3 attorney advised the superintendent
by letter of a request for an informal meeting to present evidence for reconsideration.
The meeting was held on May 28, 1980;
present were Mr. Hopp and his attorney,

edge

of

aubject

matter

and

served for the purposes of evaluation at least
twice In the performance of their assigned
duties
'Every employee whose work is judged unsatisfactory based on district evaluation criteria shall be noufied in writing of stated specific
areas of deficiencies along with a suggested
specific and reasonable program for improvement on or before February 1st of each year
A probationary period shall be established beginning on or before February 1st and ending
no later than May 1st The purpose of the
probationary period is to give the employee
opportunity to demonstrate improvements in
his or her areas of deficiency
Lack of
necessary improvement shall be specifically
documented m writing with notification to the
probationer and shall constitute grounds for a
finding of probable cause under RCW 28A.58.450 or 28A 67 070, as now or hereafter amended
2. The record does not contain a copy jf Mr
Hopp s evaluations. Since no error was assigned to the court's findings relative to the
evaluations wr idopt them as verities
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the District superintendent,, Mr. Motta, and
counsel for the District. Mr. Hopp presented letters from several feilow teachers and
other supporters in addition to a memorandum of legal authority. On J u n e 3, 1980,
the superintendent recommended nonrenewal of the contract to the Oroville School
Board.
'V ii. •
:he board of directors
^w.... ,.-.- :he matter. Mr. Hopp
wn.i airx
and represented by two
ait*>rne\^ - . . ./mi tied additional arguments on M<- Hopp's benalf. At a special
meeting on June 17, 1980, the Board voted
not to renew Mr. Hopp's teaching contract
and notified him of their decision.
Mr. Hopp subsequently filed a petition
for writ of certiorari asking the Okanogan
3

~ "V 28A.67.072 states

withstanding the provisions of RCW
-170 is now or hereafter amended, every
* )yed by a school district in a teachnonsupervisory certificated posisubject to nonrenewal of employprovided in this section durof employment by such dis•> iefined in this section
ed to as 'provisional
tendent of the
- the employment
contract or any provisional employee should
not be renewed by the district for the next
ensuing term such provisional employee shall
be notified thereof in writing on or before May
15th preceding the commencement of such
school term, which notification shall state the
reason or reasons for such determination.
Such notice shall be served upon the provisional employee personally, or by certified or registered mail, or by leaving a copy of the notice at
the place of his or her usual abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein. The determination of the superintendent shall be subject to the evaluation
requirements of RCW 28A.67.065, as now or
hereafter amended.
"Every such provisional employee so notified, at bis or her request made in writing and
filed with the superintendent of the district
within ten days after receiving such notice,
shall be given the opportunity to meet informally with the superintendent for the purpose
of requesting the superintendent to reconsider
his or her decision. Such meeting shall be held
no later than ten days following the receipt of
such request, and the provisional employee
shall be given written notice of the date, time
and place of meeting at least three days prior
thereto. At such meeting the provisional em-

Superior Court to review the school district's proceedings. The court filed findings
of fact and conclusions of law denying the
petition and dismissed the action with prejudice,
On appeal,, Mr. Hopo claims RCW
28A.67.072,1 the provisional employee statute, is violative of his due process and equal
protection rights. We disagree.
[1-3] Initially, we note our courts have
held there is no constitutional "property'*
interest in public employment. Giles v. Department
of Soc. <& Health Servs, 90
Wash.2d 457, 461, 583 P.2d 1213 (1978).
Property interests are defined by rules
which stem from state law. Bishop v.
Wood. 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48
L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); State ex re/. Swartoat
ployee shall be given the opportunity to refute
any facts upon which the superintendent's determination was based and to make any argument in support of his or her request for reconsideration.
"Within ten days following the meeting with
the provisional employee, the superintendent
shall either reinstate the provisional employee
or shall submit to the school district board of
directors for consideration at its next regular
meeting a written report recommending that
the employment contract of the provisional employee be nonrenewed and stating the reason
or reasons therefor. A copy of such report
shall be delivered to the provisional employee
at least three days prior to the scheduled meeting of the board of directors. In taking action
upon the recommendation of the superintendent, the board of directors shall consider any
written communication which the provisional
employee may file with the secretary of the
board at any time prior to that meeting.
'The board of directors shall notify the provisional employee in writing of its final decision
within ten days following the meeting at which
the superintendent's recommendation was considered. The decision of the board of directors
* to nonrenew the contract of a provisional employee shall be final and not subject to appeal
"This section applies to any person employed
by a school district in a teaching or other nonsupervisory certificated position after June 25,
1976. This section provides the exclusive
means for nonrenewing the employment contract of a provisional employee and no other
provision of law shall be applicable thereto,
including, without limitation, RCW 28A.67.070,
and chapter 28A.3S RCW, as now or hereafter
amended."*
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f ™'i/ Service Comm'n, 25 Wash.App. 174,
*)5 P.2d 796 (1980). Thus, Mr. Hopp,
provisional teacher under RCW
. 072, does not have a fundamental
property right to employment which requires us to measure the questioned statute
by the strict scrutiny test.4 Consequently,
the applicable review standard is the threepronged rational basis test of Equitable
Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Washed 465,
478, 611 P.2d 396 (1980):
(1) Does the classification apply alike to
all members within the designated class?
(2) Does some basis in reality exist for
reasonably distinguishing between those
within and without the designated class?
(3) Does the classification have a rational
relation to the purpose of the challenged
statute?
r
- ' First, we find RCW 28A 67.072 apiike to all first-year teaching or non1
employees in the District
probationary period under this
statute is a legitimate precondition to bestowing benefits of public employment
Ross v. Department ofSoc. & Health Servs.f
23 Wash App. 265, 271,594 P.2d 1386 (1979).
Last, a rational basis exists because of the
need for a probationary period in which an
employer may observe the performance of
the probationary employee prior to conferral of a continuing contract under RCW
28A.67.070 with its elaborate procedural
system. The rational purpose behind RCW
28A.67.072 was to afford a means of assuring effective teachers and proper education.
See generally State ex rel. Swartout v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, supra, 25 WasltApp. at 17980, 605 P.2d 796. The statute passes constitutional muster.
[5] Next, Mr. Hopp argues the Board
acted illegally by failing to apply the probationary provisions under RCW 28A.67.065.'
He maintains these probationary provisions
are preconditions to nonrenewal of teaching
contracts, whether the teacher is provisional
or otherwise.
4. If 'the statute or rale creates an inherently
suspect classification such as is baaed upon
race, nationality or alienage, when challenged,
it will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The
enactment would not be upheld under such an

[6-8] In interpreting a statute it is the
duty of the court to ascertain and give
effect to the intent and purpose of the
legislature. In re Lehman, 93 Wash.2d 25,
27, 604 P.2d 948 (1980). Statutes in pari
materia must be construed together in ascertaining legislative intent in order to give
each statute meaning and validity. Kirk v.
Miller, 83 Washed 777, 522 P.2d 843 (1974).
Mr. Hopp correctly points out that RCW
28A.67.065 predated RCW 28A.67.072. The
legislature is presumed to be familiar with
its prior enactments when creating a new
statute. Baker v. Baker, 91 Wash.2d 482,
486, 588 P.2d 1164 (1979). RCW 28A.67.072
states in part:
This section provides the exclusive means
for nonrenewing the employment contract of a provisional employee and no
other provision of law shall be applicable
thereto
(Italics ours.) Because the foregoing provision followed RCW 28A.67.065, we believe
the legislature did not intend the probationary requirements of the latter statute be
applied to provisional teachers. RCW
28A.67.072 merely refers to section .065 to
insure the determination by the superintendent is subject to the evaluation requirements of that section. No mention is "made
in section .072 of probation requirements
under section .065.
[9] Although the probationary period
set out in section .065 refers to "every employee whose work is judged unsatisfactory" the legislature, in the same paragraph, noted that "P]ack of necessary improvement shall be specifically documented
in writing . . . and shall constitute grounds
for a finding of probable cause under . . .
RCW 28A.67.070 [tenured employee statute], as now or hereafter amended." The
legislature made no mention of nonrenewal
under RCW 28A.67.072 which is good reason
to believe the probationary requirements of
analysis unless the state establishes a compelling interest. Nielsen v. BMT Association, 90
Washed 818, 820. 585 R2d 1191 (1978).
5. See note I.
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• • :o not apply to provisional
.nally, we note the provi:ire first year is a pro bach would make the placeon probation illogical and
-instruction should be givi statute which leads to absurdity.
._ -i v. Lund 7d W*ah.2d 945, 447 P.2d
718 (1968).
"

equentlv, we find RCW 28A.67.072
s oniy that the superintendent's determination not to renew a provisional employee's contract be made in accordance
with the evaluation criteria set forth in
RCW 28A.67.065. There is no requirement
that provisional employees be placed on probation on or before February 1 of the school
year as a precondition for nonrenewal.
Having determined the District complied
with the evaluation criteria, we find no
error. 1
[H»J r'-na. rf u * Hopp maintains the
P ' b t r c t is contractually bound to apply the
t.t"-» ^ of RCW 28A.67.065 because of a
4iteti employees evaluation policy be"ertificated employees and the Oro'iucation Association. Section 5.1 of
J
ea that an unsatisfactory
i shall include a program
\. the employee in improvnce.

This contract is subject to nonrenewal
by the District in the first year of employment in accordance with chapter 223,
Laws of 1969, ex. sess. as last amended
and added to by section 1, chapter 114,
Laws of 1976, 2nd ex. sess.
(RCW 28A.67.072). The face of the contract between Mr. Hopp and the District
clearly evidences an intent that nonrenewal
would be governed by the provisions of
section .072.
Although we see no harm in the Distz ict s
formulating a specific program to aid provi
sional employees in overcoming deficiencies
it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to
decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83
S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93, 95 A.L.R.2d 1347
(1963).
Having decided the foregoing issu*
next address the dism.ssa: :* Mr
writ of certiorar
[11] The grounds
certiorari are contai:
A writ of review shall be granted by
any court, except a police or justice court,
when an inf~
oard or officer, exercisir
:ons, has exceeded the j
-*•
'
board or off*
to ".or*r»g, 'ji

iiAAJdiuih

lal employees. <^*
equirement into tne
-is note Mr. Hopp signed
d oun tract as a :
isional certified teacher
with the Oroville School District That cootract provided in p a r t :

course of the common law, and there
appeal, nor in the judgment of the cany plain, speedy and adequate remedy at.
!*w
Although the superior courts are' vested
with inherent authority to review a controversy under a writ of certiorari, a threshold
showing must be made of one of the

S. Mr. Hopp"s reliance on Wojt v. Chimactun
School Dtst 49. 9 Wash.App. 857, 516 P.2d
1099 (1973), and Van Horn v. Highline School
Dist. 401, 17 Waah.App. 170. 562 P.2d 641
(1977) is misplaced. He concedes Wojt was
not a flrst-year teacher and was discharged
under RCW 28A.58.100. Additionally. Wojt
was decided before the enactment of RCW
28A.67.072. Van Horn, likewise, was not a
first-year teacher. The conclusion reached in
Wojt was that a failure of a teacher to substantially correct work-related deficiencies subsequent to a probationary period may be used to

constitute "sufficient cause" for discharge.
Wojt. supra, 9 Wash.App. at 862. 516 P2d
1099; Potter v. Richland School Dist. 400, 13
Wash.App. 316, 322. 534 P.2d 577 (1975). The
term "sufficient cause" only relates to the "tenured teacher statute". RCW 28A.67.070, not to
the mere statement of reason(s) under the
"provisional teacher statute". RCW 28A.67.072. Had Mr. Hopp been other than a firstyear provisional teacher, solely governed by
the dictates of RCW 28A.67.072 as discussed
above, the probational requirements of RCW
28A.67.065 would be applicable.
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grounds set forth above. Mr. Hopp has
made no showing the Board exceeded its
jurisdiction or that the proceedings were
erroneous, void, or contrary to common law.
The court, finding no violation of law or
contract, properly denied review under the
writ
The judgment of the superior court is
affirmed.
GREEN and ROE, JJ., concur.
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Sandra Lee HALSTED, formerly
Sallee, Respondent,
v.
Donald Eugene SALLEE, Appellant
No. 4191-nW.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3, Panel 4.
Jan. 21, 1982.

1. Constitutional Law *=»274(5)
A parent's right to control and to have
custody of his children is a fundamental
civil right which may not be interfered with
without the complete protection of due
process safeguards.
2. Infants <fc»l94
Termination of former husband's parental rights, made in proceeding on former
wife's petition for modification of visitation
rights, in absence of petition seeking such
termination, in absence of due notice to
husband, and in absence of finding that
statutory requisites for termination of parental rights had been established by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence was invalid
and would be reversed. West's RCWA 13.34.010 et seq., 13.34.090,13.34.110,1334.120,
13.34.180(1-6), 13.34.190.
3. Constitutional Law *=»242.1(1)
The right to travel is a fundamental
right protected by the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment U.S.
C.A.ConstAmend. 14.
4. Constitutional Law <t»213.1(2)
Where fundamental rights are involved, regulations limiting these rights
may be justified only by a compelling state
interest

Former wife sought modification of
former husband's visitation rights. The Superior Court, Okanogan County, B. E. ' 5. Constitutional Law <t=»255(l), 278(1.1)
Kohls, J., entered judgment terminating all
Procedural due process demands that a
parental rights of former husband, enjoin- deprivation of life, liberty or property be
ing former husband from personal contacts preceded by notice and opportunity for
of any nature with any member of former hearing appropriate to the nature of the
wife's present family, including his two mi- case.
nor children, and restricting his travel during pendency of case. Former husband ap- 6. Constitutional Law *=»251.6
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Roe, J., held
To be consonant with demands of prothat: (1) where no petition was filed seek- cedural due process, notice and opportunity
ing termination of former husband's paren- for hearing appropriate to nature of the
tal rights and determination of parental case must be granted at a meaningful time
rights took place without due notice to hus- and in a meaningful manner.
band, termination would be reversed, and
(2) restriction on travel imposed on former 7. Constitutional Law «=» 251.6
husband was an unconstitutional prohibiAn order based on a hearing in which
tion of former husband's right to travel there was not adequate notice or opportuniAffirmed in part and reversed in part ty to be heard is .void.
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Jean LEONARD, Appellant (Plaintiff),
v.

CONVERSE COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellee
(Defendant).
No. 89-102.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
March 13, 1990.
Initial contract teacher brought action
challenging termination of contract The
District Court, Converse County, William
A. Taylor, J., granted school district's motion for summary judgment, and teacher
appealed. The Supreme Court, Macy, J.,
held that: (1) school district's evaluation
rules did not provide protection for initial
contract teacher from dismissal, and (2)
neither implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing nor public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine apply to
termination of employment contract between school districts and initial contract
teachers.
Affirmed.
Golden, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part in which
Urbigkit, J., joined.
1. Schools <s=»147.6
School district's evaluation policy did
not protect initial contract teacher from
dismissal, as the teacher could be dismissed
even after receiving favorable evaluations.
W.S.1977, § 21-7-109.
2. Schools <3=147.6
Although teacher's contract and statutes incorporated school district's evaluation policy and regulation, those rules did
not create a contractual right of employment for initial contract teacher. W.S.
1977, § 21-7-109.
3. Master and Servant «=»30<1.10, 1.15)
Implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine serves as exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine

by granting an employee greater nghts to
sue his employer for termination of his
employment.
4. Schools <s=»147.6
Implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine do not apply to
termination of employment contracts between school districts and initial contract
teachers
5. Schools <s=>147.6
School district's decision to terminate
employment of a teacher without tenure
must not violate constitutionally protected
interest.

Patrick E. Hacker, Cheyenne, for appellant.
J.N. Murdock of Reeves & Murdock, Casper, and Mark R. Stewart of Hickey &
Evans, Cheyenne, for appellee
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS,
URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
MACY, Justice.
Appellant Jean Leonard commenced an
action against Appellee Converse County
School District No. 2, seeking reinstatement as a counselor, recovery of damages,
and attorney's fees. The suit arose from
the Converse County School Board's decision not to offer Leonard a contract as a
continuing contract teacher after she had
completed three years of employment as an
initial contract teacher. The School District moved for a summary judgment,
which the district court granted.
We affirm.
Leonard raises the following issues for
our review:
1. Whether it is arbitrary and capricious for a school district to discharge an
employee for reasons contrary to fundamental state policy?
2. Whether it is arbitrary and capricious for a school district to discharge a
teacher by a procedure which violates the
district's own rules and regulations?
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3 Whether Appellant established a
proper cause of ac^tjon for breach of an
express contract7
4 Whether Appellant established a
proper cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing7
5 Whether a teacher has a cause of
action for breach of a statutory duty7
6 Whether Appellant has established
a valid claim for violation of substantive
constitutional rights7
7 Whether Appellant has established
a claim for violation of due process7
8 Whether material issues of fact exist as to each of the claims precluding
summary judgment7
The materials submitted m support of
and in opposition to the School Distnct's
motion for summary judgment reveal the
following facts In the fall of 1982, Leonard began working for the School District
as a guidance counselor at the Glenrock
Middle School The School District hired
Leonard as an initial contract teacher, and
she worked as such for three consecutive
years l During Leonard's employment, the
School District maintained a policy and regulation prescribing an evaluation procedure The policy stated that all professional staff would be evaluated to ensure a
quality educational program, and it defined
the specific areas which would be evaluated The regulation required that the program and procedure for the evaluations
and a written summary of expected standards be presented to the staff within two
weeks of the beginning of the school year
It also contained provisions for informal
and formal probationary periods for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations. Both
the
regulation
and
WyoStat
§ 21-3-110(aXxvu) (1977) required that initial contract teachers be evaluated in writing twice a year and receive copies of their
evaluations
In 1983, Leonard received a copy of her
evaluation which indicated she needed lmI. WyoStat § 21-7-i02(a)(iv) (1977) defines an
initial contract teacher as "(a]ny teacher who
has not achieved continuing contract status." A
continuing contract teacher is "(ajny initial con
tract teacher who has been employed by the

proved professional rapport The following year, her evaluation noted improved
rapport and indicated that all areas of performance were satisfactory During her
third year as a counselor, Leonard was not
evaluated, and, through a letter dated
March 15, 1985, the School Distnct informed Leonard that it would terminate
her initial contract at the end of the school
year Leonard was never placed on probation under the terms of the evaluation regulation
Leonard filed a gnevance with the School
Board, seeking renewal of her contract.
After a heanng, the School Board denied
Leonard's request, and on September 5,
1986, she filed a complaint with the distnct
court The complaint alleged that the
School Distnct and its employees (1)
breached a legal duty owed to Leonard by
failing to follow the evaluation and probationary procedures set out in WyoStat
§§ 21-3-1 lOMxvn) and 21-3-1 U(aXviXB)
(1977) and in its policies and regulations;
(2) denied Leonard procedural due process
at her gnevance heanng and failed to provide her with sufficient reasons for her
dismissal, (3) discnmmated against her because of her sex and mantal status; (4)
retaliated against her because of her personal life, (5) violated her substantive due
process nghts by arbitranly and capnciously dismissing her; (6) denied her nght to
academic freedom, (7) violated her nght to
continued employment; and (8) breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing Leonard sought reinstatement,
damages, and attorney's fees under 42
U S C §§ 1983, 1988, and 2000 (1982).
Leonard also sought reinstatement and
damages for the School District's negligence, breach of contract, and violation of
her constitutional nghts.
The School Distnct answered, generally
denying the allegations, and filed a motion
for summary judgment The School Distnct's memorandum in support of its mosame school district in the state of Wyoming for
a period of three (3) consecutive school years,
and has had his contract renewed for a fourth
consecutive
school
year"
WyoStat
§ 2l-7-i02(a)(ii)(A) (1977).
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tion maintained that it was entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law because Leon
ard as an initial contract teacher, had no
entitlement to or reasonable expectation
of reemployment On April 12, 1989, the
district court granted a summary judgment
in favor of the School District In its deci
sion letter the court, relying upon Roberts
v Lincoln County School District Number One 676 P 2d 577 (Wyo 1984), stated
that Leonard was an 'untenured" initial
contract teacher whose employment was
properly terminated The court further ex
plained that the School Districts adminis
trative rules could not abrogate the School
Board's authority to terminate the employ
ment of initial contract teachers.2 This ap
peal arose from that decision
The party moving for a summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing
that no genuine issue of material fact ex
ists and that summary judgment should be
granted as a matter of law If the movant
establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the party opposing the motion to
present specific facts showing a genuine
issue of material fact does exist Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy an opposing party's burden
Nelson v Crimson Enterprises, Inc, 111
P 2d 73 (Wyo 1989), Jones Land and Livestock Co v Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P 2d 258 (Wyo 1987)
Leonard contends that the School District's decision not to offer her a new contract was arbitrary and capricious because
the School District failed to follow the evaluation requirements set out in its policy, its
regulation, and § 21-3-110(a)(xvii)
In
Roberts, 676 P 2d 577, this Court upheld a
school district's decision to terminate the
employment of an initial contract teacher
despite its failure to follow required evaluation procedures We explained
The only statutory requirement for terminating an initial contract teacher is
2. Wyo Stat § 21-7-105 (1977) provided.
An initial contract teacher who has taught
in ihc system continuously for a period of ai
least ninety (90) days shall be hired on an
annual basis and shall be notified in writing
of termination if such is the case, no later
than March 15 of each year

that [the teacher] be notified of the termination no later than March 15 of each
year An initial contract teacher has no
statutory right to a statement of reasons
for termination or to a hearing They do
not have a claim, entitlement, or reasonable expectation of re-employment
Therefore they do not ha\e a property
interest under state law or otherwise
Id at 579 (footnote omitted)3 This Court
also stated that the evaluation regulations
established by the district did not alter the
initial contract teachers rights because
they 'were primarily for the benefit of the
school district in performing its operational
and supervisory duties " Id at 581
[1] In this case the School District argues that it adopted the evaluation policy
primarily for use in performing operational
and supervisory duties and not for the primary purpose of protecting initial contract
teachers We agree The evaluation rules
did not protect initial contract teachers
from dismissal because, as teachers without tenure, they could be dismissed even
after receiving favorable evaluations Id.
In additon, the policy stated that the primary purpose for teacher supervision and
evaluation was to develop staff and improve teaching We hold that even if the
evaluation rules had a secondary purpose
relating to termination or retention, they
did not give initial contract teachers a claim
to, entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of reemployment Id. at 580 (citing
Willis v Widefield School District No 3,
43ColoApp 197, 603 P 2d 962 (1979)) The
School District's failure to follow the evaluation requirements did not result in an
arbitrary and capncious decision to terminate Leonard's employment
Leonard also asserts that the School District's policy and regulation were incorporated into her employment contract and
that the School District breached the conThis section was amended in 1987 by substituting 'April for "March"
3. In 1987 the legislature changed the date in
Wyo^tat § 21-7-109 (1977) from March 15 to
April 15
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tract by failing to follow them 4 In Roberts, 676 P 2d 577, this Court addressed the
same breach of contract issue which was
premised on similar contractual provisions
We held that, "[although the contract is
specifically subject to the 'policies, rules,
and regulations of the school district,'
these particular provisions did not operate
to afford appellant any contractual right of
employment" Id. at 582 We also stated
that the board could not abrogate its statutory authonty to terminate initial contract
teachers Id.
[2] In this case, Leonard's contract and
Wyo Stat § 21-7-112 (1977) incorporated
the evaluation policy and regulation, but
those rules did not create a contractual
right of employment A contrary result
would be m conflict with a school district's
authonty to terminate the employment of
initial contract teachers
Wyo Stat
§ 21-7-105 (1977), Roberts, 676 P 2d 577
Section 21-7-112 specifically states that
school district policies, rules, and regulations cannot be m conflict with Wyoming
laws Thus, we hold that the School District's violation of its evaluation policy and
regulation and of § 21-3-1 lO(aXxvn) did
not constitute an actionable breach of contract
[3] Leonard also asks this Court to
adopt and apply the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctnne Both theones serve as excep4. The following two contract provisions apply to
Leonard's assertion
4 It is understood and agreed between the
parties that this contract is subject to the
applicable laws of the State of Wyoming, the
duly adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the policies of this District which
are, by reference, incorporated herein and
made a part of this agreement the same as if
fully set forth herein.
6. Any person signing a contract for a
fourth consecutive full school year shall be
placed on a renewable contract status pursuant to Section 21-7-102. Education Code of
1969 as amended, 1981
WycStaL § 21-7-102(a)(u) (1977) states in pertinent part
"Continuing Contract Teacher"—(A) Any
initial contract teacher who has been employed by the same school district in the state

tions to the employment-at-will doctnne by
granting an employee greater nghts to sue
his employer for termination of his employment Nelson, 111 P 2d 73, Wagenseller
v Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Anz
370, 710 P 2d 1025 (1985) This Court has
previously held that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing does not
apply to at-will employment relationships
because either party may terminate an atwill contract for any reason, without reason, or for the wrong reason Mobil Coal
Producing, Inc v Parks, 704 P 2d 702
(Wyo 1985) We have recognized a limited
cause of action to vindicate the public policy of compensating workers for work-related mjunes
Gness v
Consolidated
Freightways Corporation of Delaware,
776 P 2d 752 (Wyo 1989) *
[4] We now hold that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the
public policy exception to the employmentat-will doctnne do not apply to the termination of employment contracts between
school districts and initial contract teachers The adoption of these theones would
alter the tenure status of initial contract
teachers defined m Wyo Stat § 21-7-109
(1977) and explained m Roberts, 676 P 2d
577 The power to modify that status belongs to the legislature
Leonard's remaining arguments relate to
her claim that the School District's decision
not to offer her a fourth contract was made
of Wyoming for a period of three (3) consecutive school years and has had his contract
renewed for a fourth consecutive school
year (1
Wyo Slat § 21-7-112 (1977) provides.
The contracts of all teachers in the state of
Wyoming from and after the effective date of
this act shall be subject to the policies, rules,
and regulations of the school district not tn
conflict with this law or the other laws of the
state of Wyoming
(Emphasis added)
3. In Gness. 776 P 2d at 754, we held that an
employee
whose employment is terminated for exercising nghts under the worker's compensation
statutes and who is not covered by the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement has a
cause of action in tort against the employer
for damages.
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on the basis of constitutional impermissible grounds Leonard contends that she is
entitled to relief under 42 U S C § 1983
(1982) because the School District termmat
ed her employment due to her marital sta
tus, her residency her personal life and
the fact that she reported incest cases to
government agencies 8

GOLDEN' Jubtice, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which
URBIGKIT J joins

Although I concur in most aspects of the
majority opinion I dissent from that part
of it that holds that "the pubhc policy exception to the employment at will doctrine
[does] not applv to the termination of employment contracts between school districts
[5] Leonard correctly states that a and initial contract teachers "
school districts decision to terminate the
This court identified the rationale supemployment of a teacher without tenure porting the public pohcy exception to the
must not violate constitutionally protected at will rule m Allen v Safeway Stores,
interests Perry v Stndermann 408 U S Incorporated 699 P2d 277, 284 (Wyo
593, 92 S Ct 2694, 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972), 1985)
Roberts, 676 P2d 577 To prevail under
A tort action premised on violation of
this principle however, Leonard must first
public policy results from a recognition
meet her burden in opposing the School
that allowing a discharge to go unreDistrict's motion for summary judgment
dressed would leave a valuable social polJones Land an*d Livestock Co, 733 P2d
icy to go unvmdicated
258 In Nelson, 111 P 2d at 77, we stated As it was so aptly put by the Arizona
that "[ejvidence opposing a summary judg- Supreme Court m Wagner v City of Globe,
ment that is conclusory or speculative is 150 Ariz 82, 722 P 2d 250, 255-56 (1986),
[ejmployees should not have to choose
insufficient and the trial court has no duty
between their jobs and the demands of
to anticipate possible proof
In opposition
important public policy interests • • •
to the School District's motion Leonard
[E]mployees should not be discharged bepresented the depositions of the Glenrock
cause they performed an act that pubhc
Middle School principal, the school district
policy would encourage • • •
superintendent, and five school board memA fundamental principle of Wyoming's
bers After reviewing those depositions,
we conclude that Leonard failed to demon- public policy is our commitment to protect
strate the existence of a genuine issue of children from abuse or neglect If a school
distnct can decide not to renew a school
material fact which would preclude summacounselors employment contract based in
ry judgment as a matter of law The matesubstantial part on that counselor's fulfillrials supporting Leonard's contention that
ing a statutory obligation of reporting susthe School District terminated her employ- pected child abuse and neglect and of coopment in violation of her constitutionally erating with law enforcement authorities
protected rights were merely speculative and child protection agencies, then very
and conclusory Hence, the School District soon that school counselor will stop reportis entitled to a judgment as a matter of ing and cooperating The unacceptable end
law
result is that child abuse and neglect will
go unreported and children will continue to
Affirmed
be harmed
GOLDEN, J, filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part in which
Wyoming's clearly defined and well-established pubhc policy concerning child
URBIGKIT, J, joined
6. Leonard also asserts that the School District
deprived her of her property right in continued
employment without due process in violation of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution This argument has no merit be
cause we have determined that Leonard, as an

initial contract teacher, did not have a claim to,
entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of
reemployment
Wyo Stat § 14-3-205 (1977) imposes a duty
to report cases of child abuse and neglect
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abuse finds expression in W S 14-3-104
through 215 (July 1986 Repl) In particu
lar § 14-3-205(a) provides that any person
who has reasonable cause to suspect that a
child has been abusecl*or neglected shall
immediately report it to the child protection
agency or local law enforcement agency
Under § 14-3-205(b) if a staff member of
a school suspects child abuse or neglect,
that staff member shall notify as soon as
possible a person in charge who is also
responsible to report the matter But the
reporting staff member is not relieved of
his or her obligation to report in the first
instance Under § 14-3-212, the creation
of multi-disciplinary child protection teams
within the communities in the state is encouraged Among the members of that
team is a designated representative from
the school district. The local child protec
tion teams are to facilitate diagnosis and
prognosis and provide an adequate treat
ment plan for the child and the child's
family Under § 14-3-214, a child counselor employed by the school may attend interviews of a child that are conducted on
school property by law enforcement personnel or child protective agency personnel
School counselors and teachers in particular are serving in the trenches in our
society's war against child abuse Any
chilling of that obligation to report and
cooperate cannot be tolerated Our children are much too precious and valuable a
resource to be sacrificed in the name of the
"at-will" doctrine We have recognized
and adopted a public policy exception for
the worker who files a worker s compensation claim
Gness v
Consolidated
Freightways Corporation of Delaware,
776 P 2d 752 (Wyo 1989) This court surely
has the courage to recognize and adopt a
public policy exception which will mure to
the benefit of abused and neglected children
Keeping this public policy in mind, our
fidelity to the bedrock principles of summary judgment law requires us to examine
the record in the light most favorable to
Ms Leonard, the party against whom the
summary judgment was entered, and give
her the benefit of all favorable inferences

which reasonably can be drawn from the
record evidence
The record evidence surrounding the reasons for principal Dodd's recommendation
that Ms Leonard's employment contract
not be renewed shows the following
1 Leonard's deposition testimony
And Mr Dodd * * * said to me,
something about don t discover any
more incest cases and he kind of
laughed And I guess I had a little
difficulty with that I didn t think it
was very funny * * " I felt that he
really meant it * * * '
2 Dodd's deposition testimony
• When asked if he intended that Ms
Leonard should not work with incest
and abuse matters and alcoholic parents Dodd testified, "It would be my
intent that [she] recognize the limit to
which a school counselor can do that
and still do the normal things • • • "
• When asked if she did more for
abused children than Dodd wanted her
to do, Dodd testified, 4I would have to
say in terms of the total context of the
job she spent more time with them
than could be provided within the
_ school setting at the expense of the
other group of students '
• When asked if the special cases
were taking more time than Dodd felt
she could afford as a counselor, Dodd
answered, "Unfortunately yes "
• Against the backdrop of the
amount of time involved m reporting
abuse cases and in cooperating with
investigations by the law enforcement
authorities in such cases, Dodd testified, "For the way all of this impacted
upon the total school program, it was
my professional judgment that too
much time was being spent there."
3 Assistant school superintendent
Hoyt's deposition testimony
• In early March, Hoyt asked Dodd to
explain why he did not recommend Ms
Leonard for renewal of her contract
Hoyt testified, "If I can recall his
phrasing, there was a lack of balance
between dealing with those more severe cases and what he perceived as
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being her major responsibility as far as
a school counselor was concerned."
• According to Hoyt, Dodd's reasons
for his nonrenewal recommendation
were her need to listen, her rapport
with other staff members, and the
"balance."

Criminal Law «=996(2, 3)
Tnal court has "reasonable time" to
rule on motion for reduction of sentence
which is filed within 120 days after imposition of sentence, even if motion is not decided within 120 days after sentence.
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 36.

After reviewing the record and evidence
in the light most favorable to school counselor Leonard and being of the view that
Wyoming has a clearly defined and well-established public policy regarding the reporting of child abuse and neglect and of
cooperating with the authorities in such
matters, I find that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the school district's reasons for failing to renew Ms.
Leonard's contract I would reverse and
remand for a jury trial on that issue.

Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender and M. David Lmdsey, Cheyenne, for
petitioner.
Joseph B Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W.
Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A.
Byrne, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore
Lauer, Director of Prosecution Assistance
Program, and Philip W. Jussel, Student
Intern, for respondent.
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Susan A. ARLAND, Petitioner
(Defendant),
v.
STATE of Wyoming,
Respondent (Plaintiff).
No. 89-145.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
March 15, 1990.

Defendant petitioned for a writ of <&rtiorari, challenging the trial court's refusal
to rule on a motion for reduction of sentence. The Supreme Court, Urbigkit, J.f
held that the trial court had a reasonable
amount of time to rule on a timely motion
for reduction of sentence, even if the motion had not been decided within 120 days
after imposition of sentence.
Remanded.
1. After the record was Hied in this court, it was

Before CARDINE, CJ., and THOMAS,
URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
URBIGKIT, Justice.
This appeal involves the prospective-retrospective status of changes this court has
made by amendments to the Wyoming
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically
addressed is W.R.Cr.P. 36 (similar to the
prior F.R.Cr.P. 35) relating to authority of
the trial court to alter or amend a criminal
sentence after entry.
Petitioner, Susan A. Arland, plead guilty
to embezzlement and larceny by bailee in
taking money from her employer, The
Learning Center of Teton County, as offenses charged in multiple counts. On
March 27, 1987, she was sentenced to confinement at the Wyoming Women's Center
for a term of three to five years and required to make restitution of $38,889.83,
which was "reduced to judgment" by the
sentence. Arland, thirty-nine and divorced,
had a fourteen year old daughter and no
previous criminal involvement
On July 7, 1987, Arland moved for a
sentence reduction premised on a favorable
report from the women's confinement institution. The county attorney objected and
the formal official record then ends without
any action on her motion.1 After receipt of
supplemented by court order authorizing Ar-
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Procedure, § 609, fn 14, p 207 (12th ed
1976)
[3] In this case the sentencing judge
had all the pertinent information before
him He listened to the appellant, his attorney, and several character witnesses, he
had the benefit of a presentence report
The statute to which appellant pled guilty
allows for a sentence not to exceed five
years The judge sentenced appellant to a
period withm that statutory maximum and
gave his reasons therefor We cannot say
that this was a clear abuse of discretion
We affirm

|MYHUMM»VrtUM^

Shirley ROBERTS, Appellant (Plaintiff),
v.
LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE,
Appellee (Defendant).
No. 83-125.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Feb 16, 1984.
Initial contract teacher appealed from
the decision of the District Court, Lincoln
County, John D Troughton, J, upholding
the school board's decision to terminate
her. The Supreme Court, Cardme, J., held
that (1) initial contract teacher had no
statutory right to a statement of reasons
for termination, or to a hearing, and had no
claim, entitlement, or reasonable expectation of employment, or a property interest
under state law or otherwise; (2) even if
evaluation of teacher had been performed,
aa required by school board regulations,
and had been favorable, teacher would not
have been protected against an arbitrary or
capncious discharge, (3) such policy of
evaluations did not give teacher a constitutionally protected property right in the re-

newal of her contract and, therefore, failure to follow such policy did not affect
decision to terminate, (4) such policy of
evaluation did not operate to afford teacher
any contractual right of employment, and
(5) teacher did not meet her burden of
proving that her termination was caused by
impermissible reasons or that constitutionally protected rights were involved
Affirmed

1. Schools <*=»141(5)
An initial contract teacher has no statutory right to a statement of reasons for
termination or to a hearing, and has no
claim, entitlement, or reasonable expectation of reemployment, and, therefore, does
not have a property interest under state
law or otherwise W S 1977, § 21-7-105
2. Schools <s=>55
School board is the governing body of
the school district and has wide discretion
in the management of school affairs.
3. Schools «=»55
Supreme Court will interfere with
school board actions if they are arbitrary
and capricious or fraudulent, however,
such Court will not otherwise substitute its
judgment and, absent abuse, will not interfere with the exercise of discretionary acts
authorized by statute
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s»416
In some circumstances, agencies may
depart from their own regulations
5. Schools <*=»141(4)
Even if teaching evaluation had been
performed, as contemplated in school board
policy, and had been favorable, initial contract teacher would not have been protected against an arbitrary or capncious discharge since such teachers can be dismissed for no reason at all.
6. Schools <8=>141<4)
If an initial contract teacher can be
dismissed for no reason at all, such teacher
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can be dismissed without reasons supported by facts
7 Schools <3=»141(5)
School board's policy that evaluations
should be made of all teachers did not give
initial contract teacher a constitutionally
protected property right in the renewal of
her contract since such policj, which was
violated by the school board established
evaluative policies not designed for the protection of nontenured teachers that is,
their purpose was not termination or retention, but were primarily for the benefit of
the school district in performing its operational and supervisory duties, failure to
follow such policy did not affect decision to
terminate teacher
8. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=>763
Although agency should be aware of
its regulations and such regulations should
be followed, in order to invalidate an agen
cy's decision, regulation in question must
have some connection with the decision
9. Schools «»141(5)
Only requirements that school board
must satisfy before terminating an initial
contract teacher, are that the teacher must
be notified no later than March 15 of each
year and heanng must be provided if there
is an allegation that teacher's constitutional nghts have been violated W S 1977,
§ 21-7-105
10. Schools «=>141(5)
School board's termination of initial
contract teacher was proper where it notified such teacher no later than March 15
and hearing was provided in the event she
alleged that her constitutional rights had
been violated. WS.1977, § 21-7-105.
11. Schools e»141(5)
Although initial contract teacher's contract was specifically subject to the policies, rules and regulations of the school
district, her termination because of difficulty m her coaching assignments was proper,
even though the school board regulation
requiring evaluation of teachers was not
followed by the school board prior to her

termination where no particular rule or
regulation of the school district required
evaluation of teacher in the coaching
duties, and failure to evaluate her in such
duties could not and did not matter since
the specific provision that an initial contract teacher could be dismissed at the
discretion of the school board with or without cause was controlling
12. Schools <3=>141(2)
School board cannot abrogate its statutory power to terminate nontenured teachers by contract
13 Schools <s=»141(4)
Lack of tenure does not, in itself, defeat a claim that decision to terminate was
based upon impermissible violations of constitutionally protected interests
14 Civil Rights «=»13.13(1)
While a nontenured teacher may not be
terminated from employment for exercising
a constitutional right of free speech, that
person has burden of proving that the
speech or conduct was constitutionally protected U S C A ConstAmend. 1.
15. Constitutional Law <3»82(12)
Academic freedom concerns constitutionally protected nghts and does not give
teacher the right to have discipline problems nor to be protected from termination
merely because such teacher was not
aware that the administrators were dissatisfied with the direction of teacher's coaching program U.SC.A Const.Amend. 1.
16. Civil Rights «=»13.13(3)
Initial contract teacher did not meet
burden of proving that her termination was
caused by impermissible reasons nor that
constitutionally protected nghts were involved where there was no evidence she
was terminated for any protected activity
but evidence showed she was terminated
because she could not handle the discipline
and morale problems of her sports teams.
U S C A ConstAmend. 1.
Patnck E Hacker of Graves, Hacker &
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant.
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Dennis L Sanderson, Afton for appellee
Before ROONEY, C J THOMAS ROSE
and CARDINE, JJ and RAPER, Justice,
Ret
CARDINE, Justice
This appeal is from a judgment upholding the Lincoln County School Board's deci
sion to terminate the employment of appel
lant We will affirm
The issues, as stated by appellant, are
"1 Is a decision of a school board made
in violation of its own policies and rules
arbitrary and capricious7
"2 Does a violation of school board policies incorporated into an employment
contract, constitute an actionable breach
of contract7
"3 Is the nonrenewal of an initial con
tract teacher for educational philosophies
or methods without previous warning a
violation of constitutionally protected
rights7"
Appellant, Shirley Roberts, was employed by the Lincoln County School District No One in 1977 as a physical education teacher and the high school girls volleyball and basketball coach Dunng her
second year of teaching, she experienced
difficulties as a basketball coach and was
relieved of these duties Her third year of
teaching involved coaching the high school
volleyball team and the eighth grade girls
basketball team Dunng the third year,
appellant ran into difficulties with the volleyball team The students who created
problems on the volleyball team also created problems in one of appellant's PE.
classes. The superintendent and principal
evidently decided that it would be better to
get a different physical education teacher
who could handle both the P E classes and
the coaching duties
Appellant was told by the superintendent
that he was not going to recommend that
her contract be renewed because he was
1. Section 21-7-105 W.S 1977, provides
"An imual contract teacher who has taught in
the system continuously for a penod of at
least ninety (90) days shall be hired on an

not satisfied with the direction the coaching
program was going The Board of Trustees accepted the superintendent s recommendation and sent appellant a letter formally notifying her of this decision The
letter stated that as an initial contract
teacher she was not entitled to a hearing
upon the reasons for termination, but that
she did ha\e a right to a hearing on the
issue of whether or not her constitutional
or due process rights had been violated
Appellant asked for a heanng which was
held before an independent hearing examiner who made proposed findings of facts
a.nd conclusions of law The Board of
Trustees incorporated these findings into
its decision and order Appellant appealed
the board s decision to district court In
addition to the appeal, the appellant alleged
breach of contract and a federal civil rights
action The court announced its decision in
favor of appellee on all counts
I
Whether the school board's decision was
arbitrary and capricious
[1] Appellant contends that the school
board had m effect a manual of Policies
and Regulations which were not followed,
and, therefore, their decision was pnma
facie arbitrary and capricious Appellant
was an initial contract teacher The only
statutory requirement for terminating an
initial contract teacher is that they be notified of the termination no later than March
15 of each year l An initial contract teacher has no statutory right to a statement of
reasons for termination or to a heanng.
They do not have a claim, entitlement, or
reasonable expectation of re-employment
Therefore, they do not have a property
interest under state law or otherwise.
O'Melia v Sweetwater County School District No 1, Wyo, 497 P2d 540 (1972);
Schmidt v Fremont County School District No 25, 406 F^upp 781 (Wyo 1976),
annual basis and shall be notified in writing
of termination, if such is the case, no later
than March 15 of each year M
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Bertot v School Ehstnct /Vo / Albany
County, Wyoming, 522 F id 1171 (10th
Cir 1975)
[2,31 The school board is the governing
body of the school district It has wide
discretion in the management of school af
fairs Hyatt v Big Horn School District
No I Wyo, 636 P2d 525 (1981) The
board has the power to employ teachers,
§ 21-3-lll(a)(vi)(C), W S 1977
approve
salary provisions, § 21-7-104 W S 1977,
terminate initial contract teachers § 21-7105, W S1977, and suspend or dismiss
teachers, § 21-7-110, W S 1977 We will
interfere with school board actions if they
are arbitrary and capricious or fraudulent,
however, we will not otherwise substitute
our judgment Absent abuse we will not
interfere with the exercise of discretionary
acts authorized by statute Hyatt v Big
Horn School District No 4, supra
Appellant received one formal evaluation
during the school year in which her contract was not renewed Although appel
lant did not have a property right to reemployment, she nevertheless contends that
because policies and regulations of the
school district requiring four evaluations
during the school year2 were not followed,
the decision to terminate must be reversed
Appellant contends that the school dis
tnct's failure to follow its own evaluative
policies and regulations is patently arbitrary and capncious, and relies upon Vitarelh v Seaton, 359 U S 535, 79 S Ct 968, 3
2.

"EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF
TEACHERS
"Formal valuations for nontenure teachers
shall be made at least four times each year on
forms to be provided The first two evaluations shall be completed before December,
and the second two before March of each
school year
The minimum basic procedures leading to
formal evaluations of teachers shall include
the following*
"1 The principal or his designated represent
ative (assistant principal, district administra
tor and/or supervisor) shall visit each teach
er in the classroom several times during each
school year and shall record the general nature of visitations on a form to be provided,
with a copy for the teacher and the principal

L Ed 2d 1012 (1959) for the proposition that
when an agency promulgate* regulations, a
failure to act in accordance with the procedures set forth therein cannot be sustained
We accepted this principle in keslar v Police Cunl Service Comm'n, City of Rock
Spring* Wyo 665 P2d 937 (1983) Keslar and Vitarelh stand for the proposition
that an individual whose status or position
is being affected by agency action has the
right to enforce those agency rules which
were promulgated and designed to afford
protection in the given situation
[4J However in some circumstances
agencies may depart from their own regulations Thus
" • • • Most courts which have allowed
departures have based their conclusions
on findings that the regulation which
was violated was intended to govern internal agenc> procedures, rather than to
protect any interest of the objecting party
* • ' * (Footnotes omitted) 87
Harvard L Rev 629, Violations by Agencies of their own Regulations
Willis v Wide field School District No 3,
43 Colo App 197 603 P 2d 962 (1979), involved nontenured teachers and school district procedures which required teachers to
be evaluated twice a year The policy stated that this requirement had the primary
purpose of improving the quality of teaching and the secondary purpose of retention
or dismissal The court held that a failure
to follow the evaluation procedures did not
All observations shall be conducted openly
and with the full knowledge of the teacher A
teacher or the principal or his designated representative may request a conference to discuss the visit
2 At least once each year in the case of
tenure teachers, and at least twice each year
tn the case of nontenure teachers, the principal or his designated representative shall
schedule a formal evaluative interview with
each teacher pnor to the evaluation deadlines
established
"Current practice codified 1978
Board approved and issued date of manual
adoption
'School District No 1, Lincoln County, Kenv
merer Wyoming" (Emphasis added )
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invalidate a decision to terminate a nonten
ured teacher
The purpose for these evaluations is set
forth in the manual of Policies and Regula
tions of School District No One under
Evaluation of Professional Staff Teachers
and is stated as
" ' * * to assist teachers to develop and
strengthen their professional abilities
through an assessment of strengths and
weaknesses Teacher evaluation shall be
a process through which the pnncipal
provides guidelines, suggests ways to
overcome difficulties, makes commenda
taons, and determines the progress of a
teacher's professional performance Ex
ceptional performance by a staff member
should also be recognized on such occasion "
In this case, the regulations establishing
evaluative policies were not designed for
the protection of nontenured teachers such
as appellant, but were primarily for the
benefit of the school district in performing
its operational and supervisory duties
[5-7] Their purpose was not termma
tion or retention Even if the evaluations
had been performed and been favorable,
appellant would not have been protected
against an arbitrary or capricious discharge If one can be dismissed for no
reason at all, one can be dismissed without
reasons supported by facts Jeffries v
Turkey Run Consolidated School District, 492 F 2d 1 (7th Cir 1974) The policy
that evaluations should be made did not
give appellant a constitutionally protected
property nght in the renewal of her contract See Weathers v West Yuma County School District R-J-ly 530 F2d 1335
(10th Cir 1976)
[81 We recognize the policy that agencies should be aware of their regulations
and that these regulations should be followed However, m order to invalidate an
agency's decision, the regulation in question must have some connection with the
decision Appellant was an initial contract
teacher As such, she had no statutory or
other legally protected property or interest
m continuing employment We cannot find

that the stated evaluation policies created a
nght and therefore the failure to follow
them did not affect the decision to terminate
In the present situation evaluations
were required for classroom teachers Appellant was dismissed for reasons concerning her outside duties as a coach She was
not terminated for her classroom performance Appellant was relieved of her initial
position as basketball coach because of difficulties In her third year of teaching, she
experienced problems with the volleyball
team These problems were characterized
as morale and discipline problems The
administrators evidently felt that they had
a choice of relieving appellant of these
duties also or of hiring a teacher who was
adequate in both classroom performance
and coaching abilities
The cases cited by appellant in support of
her position can be easily distinguished
They either involve tenured teachers {Wojt
v Chimacum School District No 49, 9
Wash App 857 516 P 2d 1099 (1973), Bnninstool v New Mexico State Board of
Education 81 NM 319 466 P2d 885
(1970)), or procedures specifically geared
toward the purpose of termination (Tnmboli v Board of Education of Wayne
County W V , 280 S E 2d 686 (1981), Lehman v Board of Education of City
School District of City of New York, 82
A D 2d 832, 439 N Y S 2d 670 (1981))
[9,10] We find that the procedures concerning evaluation of probationary teachers
are not related to the decision to retain or
terminate a probationary teacher A separate section of the school district's rules
and regulations apply specifically to the
termination, suspension, or dismissal of
teachers and pupils This section states
that
"Section 2 Termination of Initial
Contract Teachers The contract of an
initial teacher may be terminated by the
Board upon notification in writing of
such termination by registered or certified mail to the last known address of
such initial contract teacher no later than
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March 15 of each year Proof of such
written notice together with the proof of
mailing shall be kept and retained in the
records of the school district
he only requirements that the board must
atisfy before terminating an initial con
ract teacher is that the teacher must be
totified no later than March 15 of each
ear and a hearing must be provided if
here is an allegation that the teacher s
onstitutionai rights have been violated
The school district satisfied these requirenents and acted properly in the termina
ion of appellant
II
Did the violation of these policies contitute an actionable breach of contract7
Appellant contends that the evaluation
policies were incorporated into her teacher
employment contract, and therefore, the
school district s inaction regarding the evaluations resulted in a breach of contract
The applicable contract provisions are
"3 DUTIES OF TEACHER The teach
er shall perform all duties and services
of a teacher faithfully and satisfactorily
at the time, place and for the duration
prescribed by the District, and as direct
ed by the superintendent Teachers shall
comply with and abide by all rules and
regulations promulgated by the District
and all pertinent statutes of the State of
Wyoming as they now exist or may from
time to time be adopted or modified All
such, rules, regulations and statutes
are incorporated herein by this reference and are made a part of this agreement as if fully set forth. * *

•

•

•

•

•

•

"5 TERMINATION Until a teacher
obtains continuing contract status as
defined by the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law, the teacher hereby acknowledges that he/she is employed on
an annual probationary basis and has no
expectation of re-employment An initial contract teachers contract may
not be renewed solely at the discretion
of the board of trustees with or without
cause. Unless otherwise required by

law an initul contract teacher is not
entitled to a hearing upon the reasons
for termination ' (Emphasis added )
Section 21-~-U2 WS1977 states that
The contracts at all teachers in the
state of Wyoming from and after the
effectiv e date of this act shall be subject
to the policies, rules, and regulations of
the school district not in conflict with this
law or the other laws of the state of
Wyoming
[11 121 Appellant contends that the policies and regulations are made part of her
contract that they required evaluations
that were not done and that the school
district therefore, is in breach of contract.
We cannot agree with this proposition Although the contract is specifically subject
to the 'policies, rules, and regulations of
the school district,' these particular provisions did not operate to afford appellant
any contractual right of employment.
In Illinois Education Ass'n Local Community High School District 218 v Board
of Education of School District 218 Cook
County 62 III id 127, 340 N £ 2d 7 (1975),
the court held that a collective bargaining
agreement providing that discharge should
be preceded by the faithful exercise of
evaluations could not result in the school
board delegating its discretionary powers
of terminating probationary teachers The
court stated that the reasons for terminating were not related to classroom teaching
performance, and there was nothing in the
agreement which restricted or expanded
the rights of the nontenured teacher
Here, there are no particular rules or
regulations requiring the evaluation of appellant in her coaching duties. Therefore,
the failure to evaluate could not and did
not matter The specific provision that an
initial contract teacher can be dismissed at
the discretion of the school board with or
without cause a controlling. The board
cannot abrogate its statutory power to terminate nontenured teachers by contract,
and that did not occur here.
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III
Whether appellant's termination is improper because it is based on the violation of constitutionally secured rights.
[13-161 The general rule is that the
lack of tenure does not, in itself, defeat a
claim that the decision was based upon
impermissible violations of constitutionally
protected interests. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 US. 593, 92 S Ct. 2694, 33
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Appellant contends
that her termination was improper because
it infringed on the right of academic freedom. Appellant states:
"There was nothing in the evaluative
process or the contacts of the administrators to show the plaintiff that she was
not meeting the standards of academic
content or methodology apparently selected by the administrators."
Academic freedom concerns protected
rights. There was no evidence that appellant was terminated for any protected activity; she was terminated because she
could not handle the discipline and morale
problems of the sport teams While a nontenured teacher may not be terminated
from employment for exercising a constitutional right of free speech, that person has
the burden of proving that the speech or
conduct was constitutionally protected.
Schmidt v. Fremont County School District No. 25, supra; Buhr v. Buffalo Public School District No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196
(8th Cir.1974).
Academic freedom involves:

" * * * [T]he substantive right of a
teacher to choose a teaching method
which in the court's view served a demonstrated educational purpose, and the
procedural right of a teacher not to be
discharged for the use of & teaching
method which was not proscribed by a
regulation, and as to which it was not
proven that he should have had notice
that its use was prohibited." Maillotuc
v. Kiley, 323 F Supp 1387, 1390 (D Ma*s
1971).
Appellant misunderstands the applicable
law. Academic freedom does not give out
the right to have discipline problems nor u
be protected from termination merely because appellant was not aware that the
administrators were dissatisfied with the
direction of the coaching program. Academic freedom concerns constitutionally
protected rights. Appellant has not met
the burden of proving that her termination
was caused by impermissible reasons nor
that constitutionally protected rights wern
involved.
For the reasons stated in this opinion
the judgment appealed from upholding appellant's termination is affirmed.
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INTRODUCTION

In the state of South Dakota, there are 178 public school districts
t J.D., University of South Dakota, 1993; editor-in-chief, 38 S.D. L. REV. (1992-1993); law
clerk to Honorable George W. Wuest, S.D. S. O. (1993-94).
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"substantial evidence" and "clearly erroneous" standards.197 First, the
court must determine whether there is "substantial evidence to support the
school board's decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant and
competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."198 Next, the court determines whether the school board
decision was clearly erroneous by examining the evidence supporting the
school board's decision.199 Applying a clearly erroneous standard requires
that the court determine "not whether we would have made the same decision as the school board, but whether, after reviewing the entire record, we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."200 Under the clearly erroneous standard, the supreme court is not
bound by any presumption that the circuit court's decision was correct.201
1. Application of the First Prong—Procedural Legality
a. Board Compliance With Adopted Rules
The supreme court has stated that policies, rules, and regulations duly
adopted by a school board have the "force of law"202 and " 'are as binding
as if they were statutes enacted by the Legislature.' "203 Quite simply, the
court has held that "a school board must comply with its own rules."204
/.

Teacher Evaluation Policies

There are two major areas that spawn the question oi whether a board
has complied with its own policies. One of these areas involves teacher
evaluations as related to nonrenewal of a teacher's contract.205 In Dale v.
Board of Education,206 a tenured teacher claimed that the school board
failed to adequately comply with its own evaluation policy prior to its decision to not renew his contract.207 The board-adopted policy was that teachers should be evaluated every third year for the purpose of u improvement
of the quality of instruction.' "208 The teacher had last been evaluated in
197. Riter, 504 N.W.2d at 576.
198. Id. (quoting Oldham-Ramona Sch. Dist. v. Ust, 502 N.W.2d 574, 581 (S.D. 1993) (citations omitted)).
199. Id.
200. Strain, 447 N.W.2d at 338 (citing Tschetter, 302 N.W.2d at 47; In re South Lincoln Rural
Water Sys., 295 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1980)).
201. Id. See also Tschetter, 302 N.W.2d at 46; Moran, 281 N.W.2d at 600. Under this prong,
the reviewing court must review the evidence to determine whether the board's decision was
clearly erroneous. For discussion of challenges relating to sufficiency of evidence, see infra notes
244-77 and accompanying text
202. Nordhagen, 474 N.W.2d at 512 (citing Dale, 316 N.W.2d at 113; Schnabel, 295 N.W.2d at
341; Schaub, 339 N.W.2d at 310).
203. SchnabeU 295 N.W.2d at 341 (quoting Douglas County Welfare Admin, v. Parks, 284
N.W.2d 10,11 (Neb. 1979)).
204. Nordhagen, 474 N.W.2d at 512. See also Suiera, 351 N.W.2d at 458; Ward, 319 N.W.2d at
504.
205. As stated previously, school boards must adopt a teacher evaluation policy. S.D.C.L.
§ 13-43-26. For text of the statute, see supra note 22.
206. 316 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1982).
207. Id. at 113.
208. Id.
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May 1977, and was terminated in April 1980; his next formal evaluation
was not due until May 1980.209 Since his next formal evaluation was not
due untilvafter the date the board made its nonrenewal decision, the court
agreed that it was not necessary to complete the review.210 The teacher
further argued that he should have been evaluated anyway, apparently asserting that he was without knowledge of his teaching problems.211 The
court disagreed, finding sufficient evidence in the record that the teacher
was "fully cognizant" of his own deficiencies.212
In Schaub, a nontenured, nonrenewed teacher sought reinstatement to
her position based on allegations that the school board did not follow its
own rules in regard to teacher evaluations.213 The court stated that it was
unclear whether the board had violated any of its own evaluation policies,
but that it was clear from the record that Schaub knew "that the Board was
concerned with certain deficiencies in her teaching."214 In any event, the
court reiterated a test with regard to reinstatement under these
circumstances:
[A] violation by the Board of a rule does not in and of itself justify
reinstatement of the teacher. The test in determining whether reinstatement is the proper remedy for a violation of teacher evaluation
statutes is "whether a grievant has shown that the violation substantially and directly impaired his or her ability to improve himself or
herself and attain continuing contract status."215
The court held that since Schaub had prior knowledge of her deficiencies,
and had ample opportunity to correct them before her termination notice,
any violation by the school board of teacher evaluation policies did not
"substantially or directly impair" the teachers ability to improve herself.216
A recent case, Nordhagen, also addresses compliance with a teacher
evaluation policy.217 The board had adopted a policy stating, in pertinent
part, that "[a] recommendation against continued employment may not be
given without two formal evaluations and a written plan of assistance/9219
Nordhagen argued that the plan of assistance must be a separate, written
document; while the board's position was that the written plan could be
contained within the two formal evaluations.219 The court found that it was
"clear from the record that the superintendent stood ready at all times to
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 113-14.
212. Id. The court noted that the teacher had met "numerous times'* with the board, as well
as with administrators, concerning his teaching methods. Id. at 114.
213. Schaub, 339 N.W.2d at 309-10.
214. Id. at 310.
215. Id. (quoting Fries, 307 N.W.2d at 879).
216. Id.
217. Nordhagen, 474 N.W.2d at 512-13.
218. Id. at 512.
219. Id. Within the first written evaluation was a statement indicating that Nordhagen (a principal) and the evaluator (a superintendent) "must have a conference within 30 days after the
recommendation to develop a written pian to implement the actions stated in the recommendation." Id. at 513.
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meet" and develop a separate, written plan; however, the terminated employee had "refused to cooperate in developing this formal plan of assistance."220 The court affirmed the school board's nonrenewal decision,
making special note that "Nordhagen frustrated Board's written policy by
his failure to cooperate."221
ii. Staff Reduction Policies
School districts generally adopt policies regarding staff reductions and
how terminations or changes in teaching assignments will be conducted,
should that become necessary in a district. In Schnabel v. Alcester School
District No. 61-I,222 a tenured teacher was terminated as part of a staff
reduction.223 The teacher appealed to the circuit court, which found that
the board had abused its discretion and violated its own staff reduction
policy.224 As with most staff reduction policies, the policy in question set
out a series of priorities as to what teachers should be released first.225 An
exception was allowed u 'where an individual staff member is needed to
maintain an existing program/ M226 Schnabel, a tenured math teacher, was
terminated, while the district retained an nontenured English major uwho
was otherwise qualified to teach math."227 The board maintained that this
decision was allowed under the "existing program" exception.228 Agreeing
that the evidence showed otherwise, the supreme court affirmed the circuit
court's decision that the school board had abused its discretion by violating
its own policy.229
Reduction of a tenured teacher's full-time position to half-time also
comes within the protection of the continuing contract law. In Ward v.
Viborg School District No. 60-5,230 the teacher alleged that the school board
violated its own staff reduction policy when her position was reduced to
half-time.231 Although the board contended that it need not afford any
procedural due process to the teacher, the court noted that the board's own
policy "clearly accepts the responsibility of adhering to SDCL13-43-10 and
SDCL 13-43-10.1 whenever a tenured teacher's contract is affected by staff
reduction."232 It was undisputed that the board failed to comply with the
due process dictates of those statutes.233 Thus, the supreme court affirmed
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 295 N.W.2d 340 (S.D. 1980).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 340-41.
225. Id. at 341.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 342.
228. Id.
229. Id. See Sutera, 351 N.W.2d at 459 (holding that the school board was compelled by its
own staff reduction regulations to renew the contract of a tenured teacher with 13 years' experience rather than retain a nontenured teacher).
230. 319 N.W.2d 502 (S.D. 1982).
231. Id. at 503.
231 Id. at 504.
233. Id.
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Re:

08921156

Ms. Dianna L. Broadbent
127 North 400 West
Smithfield, Utah 84335-2720
Dear Ms. Broadbent:
The U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR),
has completed its investigation of the complaint you filed against
the Cache County School District (District), a recipient of Federal
financial assistance from the Department, The investigation was
conducted pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Section 504) , 29 U.S.C. § 794 and its implementing regulation at
34 C.F.R. 5 104,61, as it incorporates 34 C.F.R. S 100.7(e) and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Title II) ,
42 U.S.C. S 12134 and its implementing regulation at 28 C.F.R. §
35.140(a) and (b)(2), as it incorporates 29 C.F.R. S 1630.12(a),
You alleged that the District retaliated against you by refusing to
renew your employment contract. Specifically, you alleged that the
District took this action after you participated in an evaluation
team decision to classify a student as eligible for special
education services, contrary to the expressed wishes of District
officials.
During its investigation, OCR examined District policies and
procedures, other pertinent documents and interviewed you, District
administrators, faculty and other staff. Based on our findings, we
have determined that the District did not retaliate against you and
is in compliance with Section 504 and Title II. The bases for our
conclusions are summarized below.
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Background:
You were employed as a provisional special education teacher with
the District for three years, from 1989-92. From approximately
October 1991 to February 1992, you acted as the case coordinator
for a student, (JB) , who was referred for a special education
evaluation. During that time a series of staffing meetings were
held at which the team discussed JB. The District Director for
Special Education Services (Director) and the Psychologist stated
that in their opinion, psycho-educational testing showed that JB
was not* eligible for special education services.
At an IEP meeting on February 25, 1992, attended by several members
of the team, youself, and JB's parent, a decision was made to place
JB into special education and an IEP was signed. The Psychologist
and the Director stated they did not attend because they were not
notified of this meeting.
You and another special education
teacher, the Head of the Department at the school, stated that one
week after the IEP was signed, you were called into the Principal's
office and the Director angrily informed you that you should have
followed her recommendation. Both the Director and the Principal
recall discussing the placement decision with you and the teacher
on that date but deny that any threatening or angry statements were
made.
You stated that on March 31, 1992, you were notified that your
contract would not be renewed and you would not be offered a
tenured teaching position* You alleged that the District did not
renew your contract in retaliation for the placement decision.
You filed an internal grievance which was denied upon appeal*
During the investigation, District administrators stated that you
were not offered a tenured teaching position because of you
"philosophy and attitude" of special education and because of your
"disruptive" style in advocating for placement of students into
special education.
Tr»g«l standard:
The regulations implementing Section 504 at 34 C.F.R. § 104.61 as
it incorporates 34 C.F.R. S 100.7(e), and Title II at 28 C.F.R* §
35.140 as it incorporates 29 C.F«R. S 1630.12(a), provide that no
recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or
discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering
with any right or privilege secured by Section 504 or Title II, or
because she or he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or
hearing under these regulations. Activities protected by this
section include asserting a right for disabled students.

page 3 - Ms. Dianna L. Broadbent
In the investigation of a retaliation allegation, OCR considers
whether the complainant participated in a protected activity,
whether the District was aware of the protected activity, whether
the complainant suffered adverse action(s) , and whether there is a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action of the recipient. If these elements are established OCR
then
considers whether the recipient has
a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and whether such reason is
a pretext for discrimination.
Protected Activity:
You acted as case coordinator for the evaluation of JB for special
education services. The Director and Principal indicated that you
advocated placing students in special education more often than
they believed was appropriate. On February 25, 1992, you and other
District staff agreed to place JB in special education despite the
Director's and Psychiatrist's recommendation that JB not be
serviced in special education. The special education department
learned of the placement decision the following day.
OCR thus found that you raised issues of appropriate placement for
students whom you believed to be in need of special education
services at an IEP meeting and at other times. The placement of
handicapped students is a District effort. Your disagreement with
the District's efforts concerning appropriate placement constitutes
a protected activity within the meaning of Section 504 and the ADA.
Adverse Action:
OCR obtained copies of District policies governing provisional
employees (such as you) and the Utah Educator Evaluator Law which
covers both provisional and tenured teachers.
The District's
policies state that provisional teachers are those with less than
three years of successful teaching experience and are hired without
the right of expectation of continued employment. These policies
also provide that when a District intends to renew a provisional
teacher's contract, notification will be made, where possible, at
least two months before the end of the school year.
District policies are silent with regard to notification of
nonrenewal of provisional teachers' contracts• Utah state law only
requires 60 days advance notice for nonrenewal of tenured teachers'
contracts.
The Principal and the Director stated that their
practice is to comply with that requirement even for nontenured
teachers and notification of nonrenewal is given by April 1 or 60
days before the end of the school year.
The District notified you of its decision not to renew your
contract on March 30, 1992. OCR thus found that you were given
adequate notice of the nonrenewal of your contract.
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OCR considered the evidence of adverse or differential treatment in
connection with the nonrenewal of your contract. OCR reviewed the
evaluations received by you during the three years you were
employed by the District. You received good evaluations from the
Principal, Assistant Principal and the Director. You received only
one below standard rating from the Principal in March 1991. Your
provisional contract was renewed for the first two years, but after
the third^ year, only three and a half weeks after your
participation in a team decision to qualify JB for special
education, your contract was not renewed.
OCR found that eight other provisional teachers' contracts had not
been renewed by the District since 1989. Two of these were special
education teachers.
One special education teacher chose to
transfer to regular education.
The second special education
teacher received good evaluations in the first year, but mixed
evaluations in her second year. However, the information in the
files failed to document what personnel actions were taken in
connection with problems in performance or evaluation. OCR thus
found inconclusive evidence of differential treatment.
OCR nevertheless found that you received good evaluations by the
District and your contract had previously been renewed without
dispute. OCR thus found that the subsequent nonrenewal of the your
contract qualifies as an adverse action under the regulations.
Proximate Cause:
OCR then sought to determine whether there is a causal connection
between the protected activity and adverse action.
A causal
connection between the protected activity and the allegedly
retaliatory adverse action is indicative of retaliatory intent and
can be inferred from one or more of the following:
Proximity in time between the District's
learning of the protected activity and the
initiation of the adverse action;
A change in the District's treatment
learning of the protected activity;

of you after

Deviation by the District from its established practices;
or
Disparate treatment of you when compared with similarly
situated individuals.
As indicated above, OCR found that your actions on February 25,
1992, were a protected activity. The District learned of those
actions the next day. On March 30 , 1992, only one month after the
disagreement regarding JB's placement, the District notified you of
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the adverse action, the nonrenewal of your contract. Thus, the
adverse act shortly followed the protected activity.
The
nonrenewal of your contract also marked a change in treatment,
because you had previously received good evaluations and contract
renewals.
Because OCR found a proximity in time between the protected
activity and adverse action and a change in treatment after the
adverse action, OCR finds a causal connection between these acts.
Legitimate. Nondiscriminatory Reasons(s) :
Having established a prima facie case of retaliation, OCR then
considered whether the District can offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and whether reasons offered are a
pretext for retaliation.
Philosophy and Attitude
The Principal and the Director of Special Education stated that
they made the decision not to offer you a tenured teaching position
because of your educational "philosophy and attitude."
The
Director also stated that she did not believe there was any way to
remediate your "attitude and philosophy." Both indicated that you
advocated for the placement of more students into Special Education
classes than they believed was necessary or appropriate.
The
Assistant Principal indicated that you had philosophical problems
with the District and the Special Education staff's placement
recommendations.
They also indicated that your style of
questioning and challenging special education placement decisions
was at times disruptive.
As examples of disruptive behavior the Principal and Director
stated you often required scheduling changes of IEP meetings, and
challenged the Psychologist's testing results as part of your
advocacy. They also stated that you invited all of the student's
teachers to participate in IEP meetings as a means of intimidating
the psychologist into classifying a student in need of special
education.
OCR interviewed the other two special education teachers at your
school and the Special Education Teacher's Aide, four regular
education teachers, the Assistant Principal, the Psychologist, the
Speech Therapist, and a school Counselor who variously described
you as a good to exceptional teacher. When asked specifically
about your philosophy, special education staff stated you acted out
of concern for students.
The Principal stated that he spoke to you five or six times during
your provisional period at the request of the Director, about
problems he perceived with your attitude.
You denied having
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conversations with the Principal regarding dissatisfaction with
your teaching. The Principal indicated that you did not make any
changes in your behavior. The Principal further stated that he did
not keep a written record of these meetings because you were a
provisional teacher and he thought he was only required to document
such information for tenured teachers.
The Director stated she only discussed her dissatisfaction with you
with the Principal because she considered the Principal to be her
supervisor. The Head of the Special Education department confirmed
that she was not informed of any problems with your performance .
The Principal, Assistant Principal and the Director gave you
letters of recommendation in April of 1992, with positive remarks.
The Principal stated during his OCR interview that he thought you
had trouble getting along with other teachers, despite his positive
recommendations.
While OCR found that staff members considered that you acted out of
concern for students, your methods and special education philosophy
and attitude were considered disruptive or inappropriate by staff
members including the Principal, the Director of Special Education,
and the Assistant Principal. District staff explained that they
did not document problems in your performance because you were
hired without the right or expectation of continued employment.
OCR found that an inconsistency between the District's and your
approach or philosophy of special education is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis for the nonrenewal of your contract.
Scheduling
The Principal and the Director stated that you were, at times,
disruptive and required "scheduling changes" for meetings that were
inconvenient for staff. They presented no specific examples of
incidents in which you were responsible for disrupting school staff
by requiring scheduling changes. However, the Principal met with
special education staff during school year 1991-92, and asked them
to make scheduling requests through his off ice, rather than through
you.
Special education staff remembered the Principal's directive but
did not think that he gave the name of the individuals causing
scheduling problems.
The staff reported that meetings were
thereafter scheduled by a special education aide. The aide noted
that the Principal indicated he did not want you to schedule
meetings directly so he could keep track of what you and other
special education teachers were doing*
Meetings were at times
rescheduled by the aide to accommodate special education staff, the
Psychologist and parents.
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The Psychologist stated that she was not informed of the February
25, 1992 IEP meeting concerning JB. The aide and you stated that
you had left a messages for the Psychologist at her office since
she had attended previous meetings. The Psychologist stated that
she never received such a message. The Director also stated that
he was unaware of the meeting. Although it appears that scheduling
procedures were not followed regarding JB's IEP meeting, OCR could
not determine whether you interfered with this process.
OCR nevertheless found that the Principal expressed problems in
entrusting special education scheduling to you and specifically
requested that you be removed from this task. The legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason presented by the District was thus
substantiated by our investigation.
TEP Results and Meetings
The Principal and the Director stated that you challenged the
Psychologist's decisions when evaluating students for special
education• The Psychologist confirmed that you often disagreed
with her conclusions.
You stated that you were "surprised" by some decisions made with
regard to the placement of special education students and you
"inquired" about decisions, You denied that you ever argued or
confronted the Director or the Psychologist over these decisions„
Other special education staff acknowledged that you disagreed with
some District staff, including the Director and Psychologist, but
did not think you invited teachers to IEP meetings specifically for
the purpose of pressuring the Psychologist.
OCR found that you challenged the findings and recommendations of
the Psychologist and Director at IEP meetings* While some staff
members expressed no problem with the practice, administrative
staff disputed the appropriateness of this practice. OCR finds
that the District presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis
for the nonrenewal of your contract based on perceived difficulties
in accepting other staff members recommendations when you did not
agree with those recommendations,
JB's Special Education Placement
The Principal, the Assistant Principal and the Director stated that
the nonrenewal of your contract was not specifically attributed to
the qualification of JB for special education.
However, the
District indicated that you did not follow appropriate procedures
regarding JB's placement and qualification into special education.
District staff were in disagreement over JB's placement.
The
Psychologist and the Director stated that JB did not qualify for
special education based on his test results, and that JB's problems
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could be addressed through means other than special education*
Other team members indicated that special education services were
necessary to address JB's academic and social problems and that
they wanted an opportunity to refute the testing results.
on February 17, 1992, several IEP staff members of the team
expressed concern for J3 in a letter to the Director, The Director
responded by means of a memorandum dated February 25, 1992. The
memorandum was addressed to each IEP team member and indicated that
JB did not qualify for special education services, though the team
could "override" test results with adequate data. An IEP meeting
was held later that day, which placed JB in special education
despite the Director's recommendation* The IEP was signed by all
members present except for one of the two other attending special
education teachers. The IEP meeting was held without the Director
or Psychologist, who insisted that they were not notified of the
meeting. You asserted that you were not aware that any procedures
had been violated and believed to be acting in the best interests
of the student.
The Director and the Psychologist stated that District policy
required the presence of a psychologist at JB's IEP meeting. The
Psychologist explained that State guidelines require the presence
of a counselor, mental health worker or psychologist at IEP
meetings. Based on those guidelines, the District requires that a
psychologist be present at every initial placement, behavior
disorder or self-containment determination. JB was identified as
having a behavior disorder and placed in self-contained special
education classes without her presence.
The Director stated that the requirement that a psychologist be
present became effective in the District in 1990. You stated that
you were unaware of this requirement. The Director indicated that
teachers were informed of this change in policy during their
training. Special education staff stated that they were aware that
the Psychologist participated in many meetings, but her presence
was not mandatory at every meeting.
In addition, the Psychologist and the Director stated that District
policy requires a classification of behavior disorder (condition
identified for JB) to be supported by three behavior observations•
The observations were done to comply with this requirement only
after the IEP was signed. You and other special education staff
stated that they were unfamiliar with these requirements.
OCR found that you were the case coordinator for an IEP meeting
which placed JB in special education without adherence to District
procedural requirements. The failure to adhere to procedure is
significant since only the Director or Psychologist were aware of
all necessary requirements for making that placement decision.
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This failure presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the
District's decision not to renew your contract*
The District thus presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the nonrenewal of your contractOCR found insufficient
evidence to determine that the reasons presented were pretextual.
Conclusion:
Based on all the evidence reviewed, OCR has concluded that there is
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that you were subjected to
retaliation by the District. Accordingly, the District is in
compliance with Section 504 and Title II of the ADA.
OCR is closing this complaint investigation as of the date of this
letter. This letter addresses only the issues discussed and should
not be interpreted as a determination of the District's compliance
or noncompliance with Section 504 or Title II in any other respect•
Individuals filing a complaint or participating in an investigation
are protected by Federal law against harassment, retaliation/ or
intimidation by 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e).
The findings presented in this Letter of Findings have undergone a
multi-level review for legal sufficiency and adherence to OCR
policy. The manner in which we determined compliance and the facts
to support that determination are set forth in the letter. If,
after review of this letter, you believe that you have evidence
that refutes the facts presented and that such evidence would alter
the findings, you may request reconsideration of
this
determination. Requests for reconsideration must be submitted to
this Office postmarked within 30 days of the date of this letter*
Please note that a request for reconsideration must:
1„

specify which findings were based on incorrect information;

2.

specify which
findings; and

3.

provide any evidence that will support the above.

relevant

facts were not

A request for reconsideration
disagreement with our findings*

cannot merely

included

express

in

the

general

Under the Freedom of Information Act, it may be necessary to
release this document and related correspondence and records upon
request. In the event that OCR receives such a request, we will
seek to protect, to the extent provided by law, personal
information which, if released, could constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy.
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We wish to thank you for your assistance in the course of this
investigation. If you have any questions regarding the findings or
procedures addressed in this letter, you may call Mr. David Dunbar,
Chief Regional Attorney, at (303) 844-5313.

